The Deep File: Ukraine’s weeks of war
In which, I revisit the first six weeks of the Russo-Ukrainian war and its global impact.
It has been a very long month and a half of war in Ukraine and the facts on the ground have been changing rapidly. This Deep File covers events in the month of March. For those using email, it may very well be too long for the maximum file size Gmail allows, so utilize the Substack mobile app or read this post on the main Substack website to see the whole thing.
March 4: Ukraine - Bloodied but unbowed… for now.
We’re almost ten days into the Russo-Ukrainian war and things have not gone well for the Russians. Last week’s newsletter was solely dedicated to the first days of the invasion, and it certainly has been a busy week since then, but oddly stable in the sense that the Russian objectives are clear (Putin wants Kyiv and wants to effect regime change), but the Ukrainian people have largely stalled those advances while the US and its allies are absolutely hammering Putin’s regime with sanctions and international condemnation.
That being said, though, the ground war is changing. Kherson has fallen and Russian forces continue to work towards Kyiv while Belarus is increasingly looking like it may augment Russian forces, which would be a fairly dramatic expansion of the war.
On the diplomatic front, the war appears to have galvanized European countries in their opposition, and the biggest surprise here is Germany. After initially taking a somewhat flimsy position, Germany made a significant reversal in it's generally pascifistic post-World War II foreign policy to join European countries in sending lethal military aid to Ukraine.
For the US, the war in Ukraine presents an opportunity for embattled President Joe Biden to play it tough on the world stage (short of war) with a majority of Americans on his side. However, therein lies the problem. As with Afghanistan, what’s the objective? Is America trying to wind down this war or hurt Putin? If we’re trying to wind down the war and force Putin into withdrawing, then there needs to be discussion of what an offramp for Putin could look like. However, that doesn’t seem to be an interest for the US, the EU, or the Western world in general right now. With the hagiographic media coverage of Ukraine’s admittedly heroic defense, and the arrival of foreign fighters to support that defense, it’s unlikely that Western powers are going to be ready to explore that option very soon.
My fear is that after two decades of low intensity “forever wars”, Americans are ready to at least watch a traditional “good guy vs. bad guy” war, and a media and President eager to put their Covid bungling behind them are ready to oblige them.
Meanwhile, the war's regional and global ripple effects will start to be felt even as the fighting intensifies, and those ripple effects could merge with the economic problems here at home in a dangerous way for President Biden.
March 11: Unleashing the dogs of war in Ukraine
The Russo-Ukrainian War is in its third week and it continues to be slow going for the Russians who are sustaining comparatively heavy losses, but appear to be adapting their strategy to urban siege warfare of the kind Russia has bloody experience with in Chechnya and Syria.
Like the first two weeks of the war, it’s been hard to verify events on the ground as it seems both sides are deploying misinformation on social media. Ukraine continues to enjoy the benefit of the doubt in the Western world, but President Zelensky’s increasingly high demands of the EU and NATO may soon dry up that well of goodwill.
The debate in the US appears to circle around the question of just how far to back Ukraine. The Biden administration and Congress has upped the ante in billions in new aid to Ukraine while moving to tighten sanctions with a ban on Russian trade, but appear steadfast in refusing to engage NATO forces directly.
So far, my analysis in the last couple of weeks seems to be holding steady: in Ukraine, the sides are digging in for a long, bloody fight, while stateside, President Biden is doing everything he can to pin as much of the blame for his woes as possible on Vladimir Putin.
I highly recommend that you listen to the War on the Rocks podcast’s coverage of the war. They’ve done two episodes with an expert on the Russian military and it's easily the most balanced analysis of the conflict I’ve seen yet. Combine that with the Institute for the Study of War’s daily updates and you’ll have about all you need to track this thing.
Meanwhile, minimize consumption of mainstream media of both left and right flavors as the American media and chattering class seemed to have reached a bipartisan moment of agreement (Russia bad, Ukraine good) and stupidity (I hope to unpack that in a soon to come podcast episode).
What we still seem to be missing, here, is an offramp for Russia.
Ukraine’s global ripples
As America, the EU, Japan, and others pile the sanctions on Russia, the global ripple effects of the conflict and the isolation of Russia from the global economy are beginning to be felt. Here in America, the shock to global oil supply chains is accelerating the preexisting problems with inflation and gas prices, but inflation woes are now hitting the developing world while higher fuel costs and interruptions to Ukrainian agricultural production now suggest shocks to the global food and fertilizer supplies. While this may not adversely affect America in the short term, the developing world could be on the verge of famine and increased poverty after years of reductions to global hunger and poverty rates.
It’s not World War III yet, and doesn’t need to become one, but in a networked world disruptions to critical nodes in the network sever links with other nodes creating connectivity problems. Covid created supply chain issues, and this war is placing further stress on those supply chains requiring further adjustments, which will delay (hopefully not prevent) a full global recovery from the pandemic.
China plays it cool on Ukraine
While it seems as though the world’s nations, multinational corporations, and media outlets are dog piling Russia, China is the one global power not jumping in. Beijing isn’t leaping to Russia’s defense either. Sure, they’re eagerly backstopping Russia’s economy with oil and gas purchases, critiquing Western hubris, and maintaining their military ties with Moscow, but this doesn’t necessarily show a willingness to back Putin to the hilt.
China can throw quite a bit of weight behind Russia, but so far seems to be pulling its punches as China has its own economic problems to be concerned about and probably doesn’t want to fall afoul of the Western-led sanctions regime. China also doesn’t want to set off premature alarm bells in Taiwan with a full throated support for Russia’s right to invade a sovereign entity. Just as surely as conservative critics in America worry that sanctions will drive Russia deeper into China’s embrace, China is worried that backing Russia all the way on Ukraine would drive Taiwan into America’s arms.
If anything, China is being consistent in its economic self-interest as well as its recognition of another country’s sovereignty. Backing Russia on Ukraine would expose China’s own bellicose defense of its national sovereignty as hypocrisy. For China, there are few good options here, and so Beijing appears to be trying to maintain its status quo vis a vis Russia and Ukraine for as long as it can.
March 18: Russia’s foundering battle plan
One month in, and the all too common “this will be a quick war” sentiment that marks the beginning of a conflict has been once again exposed for the lie it is. War is hell, plain and simple, and Ukraine is no exception. While Russian forces are making gains along several lines of advance in Ukraine, those gains are coming much slower than Russia appears to have expected or planned for, and they’ve come at a heavy cost.
While the Ukrainian forces remain outnumbered and outgunned, they’ve demonstrated an incredible adaptability to the fight, played to strengths, and (so far) appear to have deployed Western-supplied armaments with devastating effect.
Though the fight clearly hasn’t gone the way Russia hoped for, the incremental advances at the front coupled with the near universal opposition (see below) to Russia’s attack seems to encourage a doubling down as Russia is reported to be repositioning its forces and sending reinforcements, including amphibious forces. The latter are coming from the Pacific, which will take a few weeks at least, so Russia is clearly planning for a larger, longer conflict. They’re not going anywhere.
The diplomacy game in Ukraine
With the war in Ukraine approaching its four week mark and the Russian attack struggling to maintain forward momentum, a certain urgency has seized the diplomatic front. Ukrainian President Zelensky has embarked (virtually) on a tour of Western capitals, including an address to Congress, where he has alternately cajoled and shamed Western governments for their parsimonious support of Ukraine and urged further action against Russia.
Notably, in the American policy space, talk of a possible no-fly zone has ticked back up. President Biden is holding the line against direct military engagement in NATO, but Zelensky’s appeal to Congress may have done an end run around Biden. At the very least, it got Ukraine yet more military aid.
Meanwhile, talks between Russia and Ukraine alternate between hopes of a ceasefire that seem to fall apart with each fresh allegation of Russian atrocities in Ukraine. Globally, Putin is becoming increasingly isolated as the talk of crimes against humanity and war crimes is now a regular part of dialog in international organizations watching the war.
Russia has pushed back against Western animosity with as yet baseless threats to pay Russia’s debts in the now worthless ruble, or to threaten a broader conflict should Western powers intervene any further.
In Russia, Putin seems to be losing control of his media apparatus as journalists are resigning their posts in protest of the war.
Bottom line, things aren’t going well for Putin on any front. Putin is a student of history, though, and knows that many Russian victories have been snatched from the jaws of defeat in the past, and he might be hoping to pull off another such success. However, as world opinion consistently sides with Ukraine and Russian forces continue to struggle, that possibility seems to be rapidly dimming.
China’s opening window of opportunity?
Tenacity isn’t the only ingredient to win a war, however, and Russia needs help, but has a shrinking list of allies. Moscow appealed to China for aid this week, but America warned Beijing off of providing such aid as it would encourage the development of proxy war between the two powers.
President Biden plans to talk with President Xi today about the matter, and top diplomats from both countries met earlier in the week to discuss the Ukraine and Taiwan issues as well. Neither country wants to get pulled into this fight, particularly not one of their own choosing, but some are wondering if China’s grander ambitions aren’t served better by goading America into the Ukrainian war while Beijing sits it out. That may be a possibility, but China has its own problems to contend with at home as a Covid uptick led to the shutting down of an entire province, and global economic turbulence could spell trouble for China, especially when it comes to food and oil imports.
March 25: The global effects of the Ukraine war
As the war in Ukraine moves into its second month and ceasefire talks continually stall, the global ripple effects of the conflict are coming into focus.
First, as is so often the case with war, civilians endure the greatest harm. Ukraine’s neighbors have been flooded with over 3 million refugees while thousands more have been killed, and thousands more allegedly shipped to Russia. This war is dramatically altering the demographic landscape of Ukraine and its immediate region.
Second, Ukraine’s role as a food exporter means that millions in countries like Sudan, Egypt, and other places are seeing food prices spike over declining imports from Ukraine. In the case of Egypt, the food price spike is coming on top of already high inflation, forcing the government to put price caps on bread and take out an IMF loan just to keep the economy somewhat stable. Additionally, Egypt is raising transit fees on the Suez Canal, which will further increase commodity prices.
Third, growing Russian frustration with the lack of progress in Ukraine coupled with anger at the Western response has Moscow breathing threats at the West. While this doesn’t imply an immediate escalation, it surely demonstrates the problem with the current American-led approach to keep layering on sanctions with no apparent off ramp to induce Russia to pull back.
How far should sanctions go?
Russian anger certainly hasn’t dulled America’s appetite for sanctions on Russia, as President Biden announced this week yet more sanctions to be heaped on the already beleaguered Russian economy.
Historically, sanctions are generally believed to be poor tools for influencing a state’s behavior, and that certainly seems to be the case here. So, what’s the end game for these sanctions? What are their objectives? Under what conditions are they removed?
To hear American and European leaders talk, these sanctions are hardening into a permanent state such that a Putin-led Russia is at risk of losing not just its relationship with the US, but its place in the G20, and the global economy in general.
If such were to happen, I doubt if even China could sufficiently backstop the Russian economy. But is such global isolation what we truly want? Should that be the price Putin and the Russian people are made to pay? On these questions, I think that opinion in Europe and the US is more divided than it may appear. Some appear to be ready to punish Russia to the utmost while others fear the implications for global trade and cooperation. I don’t have any data to back that thought, it’s just a hunch. We’ll see how it plays out.
How far should Zelensky go?
In part, my belief that Western opinion on how far to go in supporting Ukraine and opposing/punishing Russia could prove variable is based on the belief that Ukrainian President Zelensky is wearing out his welcome mat in Western capitals. After a week of public diplomacy that saw Zelensky scolding Western leaders for not doing more, he took his message to Israel where he likened Ukraine’s experience to the Holocaust (much to the Israeli government’s chagrin) before insinuating that Israel might not be a neutral mediator in ceasefire talks; and then demanded Japan add still more sanctions.
This week, Zelensky appealed directly to the populations of the world to hit the streets demonstrating in support of Ukraine, apparently to force leaders to get even tougher with Russia. That kind of forceful intervention in the domestic politics of other countries is rather a big no-no in diplomacy, but as the old saw goes, “the squeaky wheel gets the grease,” and that seems to be Zelensky’s play here. To be fair to him, he’s in the fight of his life and at risk of death almost daily, so we could cut him some slack for ignoring the niceties of diplomacy. However, there’s another old saying: “Don’t bite the hand that feeds you.” Zelensky cannot keep browbeating Western countries for more aid and weapons expecting evermore increases. There’s one glaring hole in the intelligence space right now: We don’t know the true state of Ukraine’s fighting forces. We’re very aware of the heavy losses the Russians are taking, and the heavy civilian losses, but of Ukrainian military losses and fighting effectiveness we know very little. That’s good information control on Ukraine’s part, but it also means our decision makers are flying a little blind when it comes to sending aid.